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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)c and § 78-3a-909.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the findings of fact and the evidence support the
trial

court's

N.A.M.,

conclusions

that:

1. the parents had

abandoned

2. there was a failure of parental adjustment, 3. there

had only been token efforts made by appellants to avoid being unfit
parents, and 4. the mother had neglected N.A.M. and the father was
unfit.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellants argue that this review is an issue of law
reviewed for correctness.
or ignoring

the

facts

However, the appellants are challenging

found and

relied on by the court. The

standard of review, therefore, requires the appellants to marshall
the facts in support of the findings and then demonstrate that the
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence. D.G. v. State, 938 P. 2d 298, 301
(Ut. Ct. App. 1997); State in the Interest of T.J., 945 P.2d 158
(Ut. Ct. App. 1997) and State in the Interest of M.W. 1998 WL
876390 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998).

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATUTES
Utah
Code
Ann.78-3a-313.5(1)
Mandatory
petition
termination of parental rights.
(1) For purposes of this section, "abandoned infant"
means a child who is 12 months of age or younger whose
parent or parents:
(a) although having legal custody of the child,
fail to maintain physical custody of the child without
making arrangements for the care of the child;
(b) have failed to maintain physical custody,
and have failed to exhibit the normal interest of
natural parent without just cause: or
(c) are unwilling to have physical custody of
the child.

for

Utah Code Ann.78-3a-407. Grounds for termination of parental
rights.
The court may terminate all parental rights with
respect to one or both parents if it finds any one of the
following:
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the
child;
(2) that the parent or parents have neglected or
abused the child;
(3) that the parent or parents are unfit or
incompetent;
(4) that the child is being cared for in an outof-home placement under the supervision of the court or
the division, that the division or other responsible
agency has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate
services and the parent has substantially neglected,
wilfully refused, or has been unable or unwilling to
remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an
out-of-home placement, and there is a
substantial
likelihood that the parent will not be capable of
exercising proper and effective parental care in the near
future;
(5) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in
this chapter;
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the
parent or parents:
(a) to support or communicate with the
child;
(b) to prevent neglect of the child;

1

4
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(c) to eliminate the risk of serious
physical, mental, or emotional abuse of the
child; or
(d) to avoid being an unfit parent;
(7)
the
parent
or
parents
have
voluntarily
relinquished their parental rights to the child, and the
court finds that termination is in the child's best
interest; or
(8) the parent or parents, after a period of trial
during which the child was returned to live in his own
home, substantially
and continuously
or
repeatedly
refused or failed to give the child proper parental care
and protection.
Utah Code Ann.78-3a-408. Evidence of grounds for termination.
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have
abandoned a child, it is prima facie evidence of
abandonment that the parent or parents:
(a) although having legal custody of the
child, have surrendered physical custody of
the child, and for a period of six months
following the surrender have not manifested to
the child or to the person having the physical
custody of the child a firm intention to
resume
physical
custody
or
to
make
arrangements for the care of the child;
(b) have failed to communicate with the
child by mail, telephone, or otherwise for six
months;
(c) failed to have shown the normal
interest of natural parent, without
just
cause; or
(d) have abandoned an infant as described
in Section 78-3a-313.5.
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are
unfit or have neglected a child the court shall consider,
but is not limited to, the following circumstances
conduct, or conditions:
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or
metal deficiency of the parent that renders
him unable to care for the immediate and
continuing physical or emotional needs of the
child for extended periods of time;
(b)
conduct
toward
a
child
of
a
physically, emotionally, or sexually cruel or
abusive nature;
(c)
habitual
or
excessive
use
of
intoxicating liquors, controlled substances,
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or dangerous drugs that render
unable to care for the child;

the

parent

(d) repeated or continuous failure to
provide
the
child
with
adequate
food,
clothing, shelter, education, or other care
necessary
for
his
physical, mental,
and
emotional health and development by a parent
or parents who are capable of providing that
care. However, a parent who, legitimately
practicing his religious beliefs, does not
provide specified medical treatment for a
child is not for that reason alone a negligent
or unfit parent;
(e) with regard to a child who is in the
custody of the division, if the parent is
incarcerated as a result of conviction of a
felony and the sentence is of such length that
the child will be deprived of a normal home
for more than one year; or
(f) a history of violent behavior.
(3) If a child has been placed in the custody of the
division and the parent or parents fail to comply
substantially with the terms and conditions of a plan
within six months after the date on which the child was
placed or the plan was commenced, whichever occurs later,
that failure to comply is evidence of failure of parental
adjustment.
(4) The following circumstances constitute prima
facie evidence of unfitness:
(a) sexual abuse, injury, or death of a
sibling of the child, or of any child, due to
known substantiated abuse or neglect by the
parent or parents;
(b) conviction of a crime, if the facts
surrounding the crime are of such a nature as
to indicate the unfitness of the parent to
provide adequate care to the extent necessary
for the child's physical, mental, or emotional
health and development;
(c) a single incident of life-threatening
or
gravely
disabling
injury
to
or
disfigurement of the child; or
(d) the parent has committed, aided,
abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to
commit murder of manslaughter of a child or
child abuse homicide.

(

i
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Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-409. Specific considerations where child
is not in physical custody of parent.
(1) If a child is not in the physical custody of the
parent or parents, the court, in determining whether
parental rights should be terminated shall consider, but
is not limited to, the following;
(a) the physical, mental, or emotional
condition and needs of the child and his
desires regarding the termination, if the
court determines he is of sufficient capacity
to express his desires; and
(b) the effort the parent or parents have
made to adjust their circumstances, conduct,
or conditions to make it in the child's best
interest to return him to his home after a
reasonable length of time, including but not
limited to:
(i) payment of a reasonable
portion of substitute physical care
and maintenance, if financially
able;
(ii) maintenance of regular
visitation or other contact with the
child that was designed and carried
out in a plan to reunite the child
with the parent or parents; and
(iii) maintenance of regular
contact and communication with the
custodian of the child.
(2) For purposed of this section, the court shall
disregard incidental conduct, contributions, contacts,
and communications.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
N.A.M. was born to the appellants (parents) on April 22, 1996.

Based on a referral from the hospital, N.A.M. was taken into the
custody of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) at her
birth.

N.A.M.

supervision

was

returned

to

for a short time.

the parents

under

protective

Because of concerns about the

physical environment of the parents, including problems reflected
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in an evaluation and the parents' lack of ability to operate a
heart

monitor

protective

and

custody.

perform

CPR,

On June

N.A.M.

was

taken

back

into

12, 1996, an adjudication

and

disposition hearing was held. The parents admitted the allegations
in the petition and N.A.M. was placed in the temporary custody of
the State.
Alarik

N.A.M. was placed by the state in the foster care of

(Rick) and

Staci Myrin.

Reunification

services were

provided until a court hearing on April 23, 1997.

Because the

parents' problems had not been remedied, and in fact, had become
worse, the court ordered that reunification services cease. On May
8, 1997, the State of Utah filed a petition to terminate the
appellants' parental rights.

The foster parents, Rick and Staci

Myrin, joined in that petition and filed their own Petition to
Terminate Parental Rights pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-404(1)
on May 8, 1997.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition at the Trial Court.
Trial on the petition to terminate parental rights was held on

October 28 and 29, 1997.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the

court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, setting
forth several grounds for terminating the appellants' parental
rights. The court then entered its order on December 1, 1997
terminating the appellant's parental rights. This appeal followed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
N.A.M. was born April 22,1996. At the time of her birth, she
had a serious medical condition which required the use of a heart
monitor. T. 47.

The parents were unable to care for N.A.M., or

operate the necessary equipment to monitor her heart condition.
The hospital made a referral to the Division of Child and Family
Services (DCFS) . As a result of the referral, N.A.M. was placed in
foster care while the parents received training on how to care for
her.

The parents proved unable to learn the techniques necessary

to maintain their daughter's health.
problems

This, as well as additional

in their home, resulted in N.A.M. being taken into

protective custody.

The Adjudication and Disposition hearing was

held June 12, 1996.
At the Adjudication and Disposition hearing, the parents
admitted the allegations in the petition.

The court ordered that

N.A.M. be placed in the temporary custody of the State of Utah and
a reunification plan was to be implemented.

A service plan was

established which included peer parenting to establish parenting
skills, creating and maintaining a home appropriate for a newborn, training for CPR and heart monitoring, and visitation with
the child. Exhibit 3.
Psychological evaluations were performed in May 1996 on each
parent

by

Intermountain

Exhibits 6 and 7.

Specialized

Abuse

Treatment Centers.

The conclusion on Dennis Mace was that

1
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"[i]t

appear[ed]
for

his

unlikely
child

that

without

unless

evaluation

supervised

assistance."

should
by

to adequately

not be allowed

another

adult."

care

The evaluation
to care

his
The

on Amy Mace was that she had "the learning

and

skills

to care for N.A.M.,

if

Exhibit

for
6

understanding
to do so."

would be able

considerable

further noted that "Dennis
child

Dennis

sufficiently

motivated

The study recommended that (due Amy's defensiveness,

minimizing, lack of insight and other testing results), she be
required to: 1.

Provide a clean, healthy environment for N.A.M.,

2. Attend a parenting program, 3.

That in-home assistance be

provided to teach her to care for N.A.M., and, 4.

Complete an

intensive therapy program to learn parenting skills and to deal
with her previous abuse problems. Exhibit 7, page 6.
Pat Fox

(Gordon) was assigned as the peer parent. T.49

Extensive visits were made by Pat Fox to train the parents. T.156
On July 12 - 13, 1996 an overnight visit was scheduled with the
parents and N.A.M. T.59-60 The parents called Pat Fox repeatedly
because of their inability to handle the heart monitor. T.332 One
of the problems was that they forgot to plug the machine into the
electrical outlet. T.375
After that overnight visit the parents started showing a lack
of interest T.64-65. They would resist the training by the peer
parent T.328, were reluctant to hold N.A.M., and stated that they
did not want N.A.M. T.336. The parents also showed a lack of
8
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ability to remember the instructions given to them by the peer
parent T.372. Also, during this period of time, an aunt, with whom
the parents lived, started caring for the baby instead of the
parents.
In conjunction with the deficiencies the parents demonstrated
with their child care training, they continued to fail to recognize
the importance of a healthy environment for their child.
parents

persisted

in

residing

with

an

individual

with

The
a

substantiated sex abuse referral, and the house did not even meet
basic standards of cleanliness. T. 71,133,380
Near the end of August 1996, the parents moved, without any
notice to DCFS, and lost all contact with DCFS. T. 70-73 The worker
assigned by DCFS (William McCairn) attempted to locate the parents.
He called their attorney several times. T.77-78

The parents had

not even informed their own attorney of their address or telephone
number T.457. In late October, 1996, Mr. McCairn came in contact
with N.A.M.'s parents while visiting a home on a different case
T.76.

He requested that they contact him.

the parents.

He heard nothing from

In December, Mr McCairn, attempted to locate the

parents by searching the Town of Myton. T.79
A court review hearing was scheduled for December 18, 1996.
The parents were in attendance.

From August 23 through December

18, 1996, the parents had not complied with the treatment plan.
T.151.

They had not visited N.A.M. or had any other type of
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contact from August 23 through December 1996 (four months) T.81.
They had no contact with DCFS and no peer parenting training during
that time period T.136.

During that four month time period, they

showed no interest in N.A.M., or in improving their ability to care
for her.

At the review hearing, the court ordered that efforts

continue to reunify the parents and N.A.M..
hearing on December

Following the court

18, 1996, the new DCFS worker, Jennifer

Johnson, asked the parents to schedule a visit.
parents did not schedule a visit.

T.204

The

Ms. Johnson then called the

parents' attorney to schedule a visit T.205.

Finally, on January

2, 1997, DCFS was able to arrange a visit between the parents and
N.A.M. T.206
A new service plan was developed (Exhibit 3) .
plan included parenting classes, WIC nutrition
parenting, and supervised visits.
toward

improving

sufficient.

their

financial

The service

classes, peer

The parents were also to work
condition

and

become

self

The DCFS worker, Jennifer Johnson, read the plan to

the parents and discussed it in detail.

She explained that there

was only a short time period left to develop the ability to care
for N.A.M. and that they had to be serious and comply with the
plan. T. 212-216, Exhibit 3 Ms. Johnson and the peer parent set up
parenting classes on two occasions, including a private parenting
class. T.208, 220, 252-254, 341.
either of the parenting classes.

The parents refused to attend
The parents were given the
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information regarding the WIC nutrition class. The parents refused
to attend the nutrition class.

Jennifer Johnson testified that

Amy, the mother, seemed terrified of N.A.M., that the parents made
no efforts to comply with the plan, and that they did not seem to
be serious about wanting N.A.M. in their home. T.213. The only
compliance

with

the

plan

(visits

and

peer

parenting)

were

instituted by DCFS who would take the child and peer parent to the
parents' home.

Even with DCFS scheduling the visits, the parents

canceled some, and often were not home or were late for the
scheduled visit T.271.
Supervised visits were held on January 2, January 9, and
February 6, 1997. During that time period it was the conclusion of
the DCFS worker that the parents were not complying with the
treatment plan T. 234.

A new DCFS worker, Erin Williams, was

assigned to the case at the end of February, 1997.

She also

attempted to arrange parenting classes, and set up visits.

The

parents' visits were sporadic and often canceled T.259-263.
The peer parent, Pat Fox, again went into the home from
February through April 1997 to show and teach the parents parenting
skills and how to care for N.A.M. T.340.

Pat Fox found that there

had been no improvement in the parenting skills and that nothing
had been retained from the parenting skills that were taught in
June and July 1996.

T.372

Furthermore, the peer parent found

that each time she had to repeat the instructions from the previous

11
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visit as the parents seemed unable or unwilling to retain the
instructions. T.378

The parents seemed overwhelmed, detached and

not interested. N.A.M. also did not tolerate the visits very well.
T.345, 377
The parents were not complying with the second service plan by
failing to attend parenting classes, failing to attend the WIC
nutrition classes, failing to make efforts to improve financially
and failing to follow the instructions and learn the parenting
skills taught by the peer parent. The court therefore ordered that
reunification services cease as of April 23, 1997.
made

in

the

permanency

plan

to place

N.A.M.

A change was
for

adoption.

Therefore, in May 1997 a petition to terminate parental rights was
filed by the State of Utah which was joined in by the foster
parents (Myrins).

The Myrins also filed their own petition to

terminate parental rights.

The parents made no effort to have

contact with N.A.M. from April 3, 1997 until the trial on October
28, 1997.

N.A.M. has lived with the foster parents, the Myrins

her entire life. T.153
A bonding study was prepared in March 1997 by Craig Ramsey, a
bonding evaluator expert. (Exhibit 5)

His findings were that

N.A.M. did not function well with the natural parents, that she
exhibited stress and showed stranger anxiety T.175, Exhibit 5, that
there was no significant bonding with the natural parents and that
N.A.M. showed a preference to be with the evaluator rather than the
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natural parents. T.182
parents.

The bonding of N.A.M. was with the foster

He further found that the parents lacked basic parenting

skills. Exhibit 5

The responses of N.A.M. toward the natural

parents clearly demonstrated either that there had been infrequent
visits or the visits had not been safe or productive. T.191

The

expert expressed his professional opinion that removal of N.A.M.
from the foster parents would cause significant trauma to N.A.M.
and that N.A.M. would not function and develop properly in the care
of the natural parents. T. 174-192 and Exhibit 5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court found that the parents did not avail themselves of
necessary training relating to parenting skills and use of a heart
monitor, that the parents exhibited a lack of interest in N.A.M.,
that the parents did not retained parenting skills taught by the
peer parent, that the parents living conditions were unacceptable
because

they were

living with relatives

or

others who were

unacceptable due to substantiated sex abuse charges or who's homes
did not meet basic minimum standards of cleanliness, that the
parents lost interest in N.A.M., visited sporadically and went
months without contact with DCFS or N.A.M., that the parents failed
to comply with two service plans, that the parents failed to
participate in parenting classes and WIC services on nutrition
provided to them, that there is no bonding and no parent child
relationship between the parents and N.A.M. and that the only
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parent N.A.M. knows and is bonded to is her foster parents. Those
factual findings support all the reasons provided by law and found
by the court to terminate the parent's parental rights.
ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLANTS CANNOT CHALLENGE THE FINDINGS OF FACT WITHOUT
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THOSE FINDINGS OF FACT.
ALTERNATIVELY, APPELLANTS CANNOT CLAIM THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO
NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF FACT
THAT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Appellants' primary arguments (Arguments A thru D) are that
the findings of fact do not support the trial court's conclusions
of law.

That argument fails, not only because it is untrue, but

because appellants ignore the findings of fact that support the
court's conclusion. Appellants cannot challenge the sufficiency of
their disputed findings of fact without marshaling the facts in
support of those findings.

The appellants admit that the trial

court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. See page 14 of
Appellant's Brief.

Despite that admission the appellants then

proceed to rely on their version of the facts without marshaling
all the evidence in support of the findings of fact.
State, 938 P.2d 298, 301

D.G. v.

(Utah Ct. App. 1997); State in the

Interest of T.J., 945 P.2d 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) and State in
the Interest of M.W. 1998 WL 876390 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Examination of the court's findings shows that there are
several grounds upon which to terminate the appellants' parental
rights. Those grounds include: a) abandonment of the child because
14
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of the parents' conscious disregard of their parental obligations,
which led to destruction of the parent/child relationship; b)
neglect

of

the

child

by

the

mother;

c)

the

unfitness

or

incompetence of the father making him unable to care for N.A.M. for
extended periods of time; d) the unwillingness or inability of the
parents to remedy the circumstances that caused N.A.M. to be
removed from the parents' home; e) the substantial likelihood that
the parents would not be capable of providing proper parental care
in the near future; f) the lack of concern demonstrated by the
parents to make appropriate parental adjustments by failing to
comply with two different service plans; and g) the token efforts
or no efforts made by the parents to remedy the deficiencies in
their parenting skills.
Even though the court found several grounds to terminate the
parental rights, only one is necessary to sustain the court's
termination of parental rights. Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-407; see also
State v J.N. , 920 P.2d 430 (Utah App. 1998). The appellants do not
challenge the court's findings and conclusions regarding the best
interest of N.A.M. that she be adopted by the foster parents.
The issue therefore, is whether the findings of fact support
the court's decision to terminate parental rights. A review of the
evidence shows that the findings of fact clearly support all the
grounds used by the court to terminate the parental rights.
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II. APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH N.A.M. , FAILURE
TO SHOW THE NORMAL INTEREST OF A PARENT IN N.A.M., FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH SERVICE PLANS, FAILURE TO LEARN BASIC PARENTING SKILLS,
AND REFUSAL TO ATTEND PARENTING AND NUTRITION CLASSES RESULTED IN
NO DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARENT/CHILD RELATIONSHIP. THE ONLY PARENTS
KNOWN TO N.A.M. ARE HER FOSTER PARENTS WITH WHOM SHE HAS LIVED
SINCE HER BIRTH MORE THAN THREE YEARS AGO.
A.

The Appellants Abandoned N.A.M. by Refusing to Maintain

Contact with Her and by Showing Very Little Interest in Her.
The trial court concluded that the parents had abandoned
N.A.M. as defined in Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-407 (1) .

That, as a

result of the parents' conscious disregard of their parental
obligations, the parent child relationship had been destroyed. See
Conclusion of Law A.

Abandonment includes failure to communicate

with the child for a period of six months or failure to maintain
physical custody and then failure to show the normal interest of a
natural parent without just cause. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-408(l)
and 78-3a-313.5.
Numerous findings of fact support that conclusion, including
the fact that there had been no visitation or contact with N.A.M.
from August 1996 until January 2, 1997 and from April 3, 1997
through October 28, 1997, the date of the trial.

See Findings of

Fact L, Q and V. Numerous findings of fact clearly illustrate the
parents' failure to show a natural parent's interest in N.A.M. The
court concluded that this evidenced a lack of a parent child
relationship.

The findings of the court include consideration by

16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the court of the failure of the parents to comply with the service
plans, the failure of the parents to make efforts to develop
parenting skills, and the significant periods of time in which the
parents did not maintain contact with the N.A.M..

This pattern of

behavior by the parents continued despite extensive efforts by DCFS
to reunify N.A.M. and the parents. The bonding study in March 1997
showed that there was no relationship between the parents and
N.A.M..

This lack of relationship was caused by the appellants'

multiplicity of failures, including a failure to show an interest
in N.A.M.
B.

The Mother Neglected N.A.M. by Refusing to Develop Basic

Parenting Skills.

Her Lack Of Skills Made Her Incapable of

Providing For N.A.M.'s Most Basic Needs.
The trial court also concluded that the mother had neglected
N.A.M. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on Utah Code
Ann.§ 78-3a-409. The court concluded that the mother had failed to
provide N.A.M. "with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education or
other care necessary for the physical, mental and emotional health
and development of the child/7 Conclusion of Law B.
Appellants argue that there were no facts to support that
conclusion, claiming that the appellants always had food and a home
available for N.A.M..

In making that argument, appellants ignore

the court's findings that the appellants, at times, did not even
have a home that met minimum cleanliness standards, (Finding of
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Fact J) that they, at times, resided with relatives who were
unacceptable or with an individual with a substantiated sex abuse
history, (Finding of Fact J), and that, for a significant period of
time,

they

had

no home

or at least

failed

to provide

any

information about their living arrangements to DCFS. (Finding of
Fact K).
Appellants also ignore the court's conclusions (and the law)
that neglect also includes the failure to provide other care
necessary for the physical, mental, and emotional health and
development of N.A.M..

The psychological evaluation on the mother

showed that she was capable of learning parenting skills. Finding
the Fact M and Exhibit 6. Despite that ability, the mother did not
avail herself of the necessary training on the heart monitor,
(Finding of Fact C), she showed a lack of interest in caring for
N.A.M., (Finding of Fact F), she did not try to learn parenting
skills, showed a lack of interest in N.A.M., and eventually lost
contact with N.A.M. and DCFS from August through December, 1996.
(Findings of Facts F and I thru L) . The court also found that,
despite extensive efforts in January thru March 1997, the mother
did not attend parenting classes and did not avail herself of
training on nutrition.

(Finding of Fact R) The bonding study

indicated that the lack of effort by the mother resulted in no
bonding between N.A.M. and the mother and that the emotional,
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physical and mental health and development of N.A.M. had been
provided solely by the foster parents.

(Findings of Fact N, T, V) .

C. The Psychological Evaluation of the Father Showed that he
is Unfit as a Parent.
The trial court concluded that the father was unfit or
incompetent in that his mental deficiency rendered him unable to
care for the immediate and continuous physical and emotional needs
of N.A.M. for an expanded period of time.

(Conclusion of Law C).

That conclusion is fully supported by the psychological evaluation
of the father (Exhibit 7), and Finding of Fact M which is based on
that evaluation.
Appellants' argument on this point is misplaced on two counts.
Their first error is that the court's Conclusion of Law did not
apply to the mother. The second error is that Appellants' argument
relies on Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-408 (4) , while ignoring Utah Code
Ann. 78-3a-408 (2)a, the statutory basis the court used.
D. Appellants Did Not Comply With the Service Plans Developed
to Help Them Develop Parenting Skills.
The trial court concluded that, despite diligent efforts by
DCFS, that there had been a failure of parental adjustment by the
parents. (Conclusions of Law D and E) Because those Conclusions of
Law are supported by the Findings of Fact and the record, the
Appellants argue that the issue of parental adjustment should be
limited to whether the parents were able to learn to operate the
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heart monitor.1

Failure of parental adjustment is not limited

only to the initial concern that gave rise to the removal of the
child. S.L. v State, 965 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Even if
that were the law, the ability to operate the heart monitor was
only one of the reasons N.A.M. was removed from Appellants' care.
The Shelter, Adjudication and Disposition Order from the hearing of
June 12, 1996 found, based on the admissions of the parents, that
the physical environment of the parents posed a threat to the
health and safety of N.A.M. and that leaving N.A.M. in the home
would

be

contrary

to her welfare.

The court

directed

the

establishment of a treatment plan to try and remedy those problems.
Prior to that hearing, the psychological evaluations had been
performed which also showed problems with the parents' abilities to
care for N.A.M.
A determination of a failure of parental adjustment requires
findings that the parents were unable or unwilling, within a
reasonable

time, to

substantially

correct

the circumstances,

conduct or conditions that led to the child being outside the home.
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-3a-403 (2) , S.L. v State, 965 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) and State in the Interest of G.D., 894 P.2d 1278 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995).

A parent's failure to substantially comply with a

x

The parents initially appeared to have learned how to
operate the heart monitor, but, when left on their own at the
July overnight visit, they did not even plug it into the
electrical outlet and had to call the peer parent repeatedly to
assist them with the heart monitor.
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service plan is evidence of the failure of parental adjustment.
Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-408 (3) ; State in the Interest of G.D. Supra.
The Findings of Fact show that a service plan was developed
following the Adjudicative hearing in June 1996 (Finding of Fact
E) . The Findings show that peer parenting was set up with the peer
parent, who was on call.

The peer parent visited the parents

thirteen out of the first thirty days. The Findings show that the
peer parent provided training on the monitor, that the home was
visited and inspected by DCFS and that the parents received
attention from DCFS thirty-three different times from June 12 thru
August 30

(Findings of Fact F thru J) . Despite such extensive and

intensive efforts by DCFS, the parents failed to comply with the
service plan and simply disappeared for three and a half months.
(Finding of Facts K and L).

When the parents resurfaced in late

December of 1996, a second service plan was prepared.
peer parent went back into the home, and
nutrition classes were provided.

Again, a

parenting classes and

Again, the parents failed to

comply with the second service plan.

They failed to go to the

parenting class established by DCFS, they failed to attend the
nutrition classes, they failed to maintain a regular visitation
schedule and failed to learn any parenting skills. (Findings of
Fact 0 through U)
The

court's

conclusion

that,

despite

reasonable

and

appropriate efforts by DCFS to return N.A.M. to the parents, the
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parents failed to comply with the two service plans and had not
remedied the conditions that caused the removal of the child from
the home, is supported by the record and should be sustained.
E.

The Appellants Did Not Make Even Token Efforts to Learn How to

Care for N.A.M. or to Show An Interest in N.A.M.
The court further found that the parents had made only token
efforts and, in some cases, no, effort to support or communicate
with N.A.M., to eliminate the risk of serious physical, menta or
emotional abuse and to avoid being unfit.
407(6).

Utah Code Ann. §78-38-

The appellants argue that their visits with the peer

parent, training

on the heart monitor and the psychological

evaluations were more than token efforts.
In reality, the visits with the peer parent and the training
on the monitor were not even token efforts.

The psychological

evaluations were in May 1996 to provide information and had
nothing to do with avoiding being unfit parents. During the visits
with the peer parent, the parents retained no parenting skills,
showed lack of interest, and had no contact with the peer parent
for significant periods of time.

The parents failed to attend

parenting classes, failed to attend nutrition classes, failed to
work with the peer parent and retain parenting skills, visited only
sporadically and showed no interest in developing the skills that
would help them to be fit parents. Such action, or lack thereof,
demonstrates their lack of commitment to this child.
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III. APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS AT POINTS F AND 6 ARE IMMATERIAL TO THE
COURTS' CONCLUSIONS TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS.
Appellants' arguments at points F and G of their brief are
immaterial to the issues before the Court. Appellants' argument F
that the father had ability to care for himself has no relevance to
the issues at hand.

It was undisputed

(and the psychological

evaluation determined) that he is unable to care for N.A.M.
Appellants' argument G as to whether the parents attended six
rather than five parenting classes taught by the sister of their
attorney is immaterial.

They failed to attend the parenting

classes set up by DCFS and never learned the basic skills needed to
parent N.A.M.
CONCLUSION
The court found that both parents' rights should be terminated
because of abandonment, failure of parental adjustment, and making
only token efforts to avoid being an unfit parent.

In addition,

the court found that the mother had neglected N.A.M. and the father
was unfit. Each of those grounds, alone, is sufficient to sustain
the court's termination of the parental rights.

Each of those

grounds is supported by the Findings the Fact and the record.
As this Court said in N.T. vs. State 928 P.2d 393, 401,
(Utah App.1996) N.A.M. "deserve(s) a stable, structured environment
with parents able to nurture, love, and provide for (her) special
needs."
there

N.A.M. "cannot remain in legal limbo indefinitely where
is

no

reasonable

likelihood

of

[her] parents
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gaining

necessary parenting abilities/'
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).

S.L. v. State, 965 P.2d 551, 561

The only parents that N.A.M. has known are

Rick and Staci Myrin, her foster parents. There has been no
question by any of the parties to these proceedings N.A.M. is
bonded to the Myrins and that it is in the best interest of N.A.M.
that she be adopted by the Myrins.
It is requested that the Court sustain the termination of the
appellants' parental rights.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 20th day of April, 1999.
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED,
McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellees

By:
:iark B Allred
By:
McClellan
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EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of

NICOLE ANN MACE (4-22-96)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case No.: 909850

A Child Under 18 Years of Age

I. FINDINGS OF FACT
Nicole Mace was born on April 22,1996 to Dennis Mace and Amy Opsahl. Hospital staff made
a referral to the Division of Child & Family Services (hereinafter DCFS) based on a lack of bonding
between the mother and baby, and a need for special care relative to a heart monitor. The child was
taken into custody on April 24, 1996 and a petition for custody filed by DCFS was adjudicated on
June 5, 1996. The court returned the child to the parents under Protective Supervision. The child
was hospitalized on June 5 and hospital staff refused to release her to her parents until the parents
were trained in CPR and in the operation of the heart monitor. Because the parents did not avail
themselves of the necessary training, a new petition was filed on June 10 seeking that custody be
placed with DCFS.
The baby was taken into protective custody on June 10 for the second time pursuant to this
second petition. Up to that time she had been in DCFS custody or in the hospital, but never in the
parents' custody. Temporary custody was granted by the court on June 12, 1996, after which DCFS
began to implement a reunification plan which consisted of visitation between the parents and the
baby as often as possible, establishment of a home appropriate for a newborn, having the parents learn
parenting skills, CPR skills and heart and breath monitor skills. While this written treatment plan was
very poorly drafted, almost devoid of the specificity necessary to be understood and carried out by
low functioning parents, nevertheless DCFS made diligent efforts to provide services. A peer parent
was provided to supervise visits and to teach parents appropriate parenting techniques. Peer
parenting is an expensive and intensive program where an individual spends time with the parents,
often daily, and often at all hours of the night, teaching them basic minimum parental functions which
competent parents may take for granted, such as not feeding a newborn solid foods, changing diapers
periodically, and how to bathe a baby. This peer parenting began immediately on June 12 with the
goal of reuniting the baby with the parents as soon as possible. Initially the parents exhibited a lack
of interest in caring for the baby, though limited progress was made.
Monitor training was arranged, the home was visited and inspected by DCFS, psychological
evaluations for the parents were scheduled, and the DCFS worker and peer parent spent considerable
time teaching and advising parents on things they needed to do. Visits of the child to the home
gradually increased until overnight visits were allowed with the worker checking on the family late
at night and early in the morning. The peer parent was in the home on thirteen different days within
the first 30 days or so, and was on call whenever the parents had questions. She needed to be present
or available to come to the home when the baby was there. Through June, July and August of 1996,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the parents passed the monitor training and visits were fairly regular. However, as time went on, the
aunt, with whom the parents were living, began to handle the baby during visits, and on some
occasions the parents weren't even present. When they were present the peer parent was frustrated
that basic parenting skills had to be taught over and over again at each visit because the parents
weren't retaining what they had been taught.
The parents' living arrangements were unacceptable to DCFS because they were living with
various relatives or others who were either unacceptable themselves because of prior substantiated
sex abuse referrals or who's homes did not meet basic minimum standards of cleanliness. The family
received attention from DCFS in one form or another on 33 different days from June 12 to August
30.
In late August the parents appeared to begin to lose interest in the baby. The parents accepted
the responsibility of requesting further visits. Visits became sporadic and then ceased. The parents
continued to have unstable living arrangements. At one point DCFS and the parents' attorney lost
track of the parents altogether because of their moving. They told the peer parent they were moving
but wouldn't say where, so they were instructed to call when they were ready for visits to resume.
They had no phone or transportation so communications ceased.
As the first treatment plan drew to a close at the end of 1996, the parents had complied with
the requirement of receiving the monitor training and had recently (on December 18) obtained
suitable housing. They were in non-compliance with visitation and learning parenting skills. There
were no visits whatsoever between August 27 and December 18, though there would have been visits
arranged anytime the parents had asked or even made their whereabouts known. Without visits it was
not possible for the peer parent to teach parenting skills. There was no other regular contact or
communication with the baby during this period.
Psychological assessments had been completed on both parents, the conclusions of which were
that while the father lacked the cognitive abilities to care for himself without adult assistance, let alone
care for and protect a baby, the mother was capable of learning parenting skills.
Meanwhile the baby had been with the same foster parents since three days after her birth, was
developing love, affection and emotional ties to those foster parents and was becoming integrated into
the foster family to the extent that her family identification was becoming that of the foster family.
The foster home was stable and satisfactory. The baby was ahead developmental^ and had
outgrown the need for the heart and breath monitor. She recognized the foster parents as fulfilling
the roles of parents in her life.
As second reunification treatment plan was implemented with a beginning date of January 1,
1997, although the parents' signatures bear the date of February 6, 1997. This treatment plan had
more detail than thefirstone and therefore it was more easily understood and helpful to the parents.
Visitation was still the key factor in reunification with the first four visits specified to be held at the
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DCFS office for one hour, all to be completed within four weeks. Thereafter the visits were allowed
in the parents' home and could be longer. Transportation and cancellation policies were clear, as was
designation of who could be present, and who was to supervise the visits.
In addition, parenting classes were required, as well as appropriate housing, peer parenting, and
a vague requirement to "explore occupational and educational opportunities" and to "plan financially
for their family and work towards self-sufficiency."
Visits were re-established for December 23 but the parents' attorney failed to notify the parents
and the first visit since August was January 2, 1997. Visits on January 16 and January 22 were both
canceled because the baby was sick. Visits did take place on January 2, January 9 and February 6,
with no substantial problems but with some concerns. The parents canceled the visits for January 30
and February 13.
During the months of January and February 1997 the parents failed to attend any parenting
classes though everything had been arranged by DCFS for the parents to attend; nor did the parents
make any efforts toward exploring occupational or educational opportunities or in doing any financial
planning to work toward self-sufficiency. The social worker went over the treatment plan very
carefully with the parents to be sure that they understood and emphasized the urgency of immediately
establishing a relationship with the baby. The parents did have clean and adequate housing. They
failed to avail themselves of WIC (Well Infant Child) services which were free of cost to the parents,
even though the social worker requested them to do so.
Peer parenting was attempted again beginning in February 1997. It was necessary to begin at
the beginning because the parents had retained nothing from the previous sessions. The parents were
not receptive to the peer parent because they felt that she was more interested in persuading them to
use birth control than in teaching parenting skills.
In March a bonding assessment evaluation was conducted on the baby, the parents and the
foster parents by the Family and Attachment Center, the conclusion of which was that there was no
significant bond between the baby and the parents and that the parents lacked the basic parenting
skills necessary to care for her emotional and physical well-being. Conversely the baby exhibited
secure healthy and normal parent/child attachment to the foster parents.
Also in March a second parenting class was offered to the parents. They failed to attend any
of the classes but did attend five of six sessions arranged independent of DCFS by the parents'
attorney with the attorney's sister, who had taught parenting classes in the past. The parents missed
approximately one-half of the scheduled visits with the baby in March and April. On some of those
visits the parents showed up late after the baby and the foster parents had left. Peer parenting
continued through April with no significant change in parenting skills. The baby was treating the
visits as visits with strangers or at best acquaintances, but not as parents, with some increasing anxiety
and some sleep loss after the visits. The parents seemed uncomfortable and relieved to get the visits
over with.
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The court terminated the DCFS obligation to attempt to reunify the family on April 24, 1997.
Since that time there has been no visitation or other communication between the parents and the baby
and the parents have made to efforts to change their circumstances. The baby has become evermore
integrated and attached to the only family she has ever known. At no time have the parents ever
contributed to the cost of caring for the baby. They have never been financially able to do so. and
no contribution has been solicited. The foster parents wish to adopt. They appear able and willing
in every way to provide for the needs of this child as they have done since her birth.
E. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
The court concludes that the parents have exhibited a conscious disregard of their parental
obligations which has lead to the destruction of the parent child relationship. Therefore, as alleged
in the foster parents' petition, the parents have abandoned the child within the definition of Utah
Code Annotated 78-3a-407(l).
The mother has neglected this child within the meaning of 78-3a-407(2) by repeated or
continuous failure to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education or other
care necessary for the physical, mental, and emotional health and development of the child, the
mother being capable of providing such care.
The father is unfit or incompetent within the meaning of 78-3a-407(3) in that his mental
deficiency renders him unable to care for the immediate and continuous physical or emotional
needs of the child for an extended period of time.
This child has been in an out of home placement since birth, and DCFS for a period of 12
months made diligent efforts to provide appropriate services. The parents neglected, refused or
were unwilling or unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the out of home placement.
The court notes that the 78-3a-407(4) does not require that the circumstances to be remedied are
those which caused the original removal. Rather the statute requires the remedying of the
circumstances that cause out of home placement. In other words, the causes of the out of home
placement are fluid as dangers to the child change while the child is in out of home placement.
While the primary cause of the original removal was the need to train the parents on the operation
of the heart/breath monitor, it immediately became clear that the parents were not capable of
providing the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or other care necessary for her physical,
mental and emotional health and development. This parental unfitness caused the continued out
of home placement and must be considered in an analysis of 78-3a-407(4) along with those causes
of the initial removal. Further, there is a substantial likelihood that the parents will not be capable
of exercising proper parental care in the near future.
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The parents have been unable or unwilling within a reasonable time to substantially correct
the circumstances that lead to the placement, notwithstanding reasonable and appropriate efforts
by DCFS to return the child to the parents. Specifically the parents have failed to comply
substantially with two different treatment plans. This child was removed from the parents'
custody as a baby and has been out of their custody for over a year and one-half, the childs entire
life, in spite of a diligent effort by DCFS at reunification. Again, the circumstances which lead
to the placement of the child are not limited to the original removal, but rather include other
circumstances which developed during the placement and which prevent return of the child to her
parents. This failure of parental adjustment has been notwithstanding reasonable and appropriate
efforts by DCFS to return the child to the parents.
The parents have made only token efforts and in some cases no efforts at all to support or
communicate with the child, to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional abuse,
and to avoid being unfit in accordance with 78-3a-407(6).
The court concludes that while parental rights are constitutionally protected, the legislature
is not prevented from altering the statutory grounds for termination. Protecting children and
providing permanency for them are compelling state interests. The addition of Section (4), (5),
and (6) to 78-3a-407 was within the province of the legislature to do, and these subsections are
not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore are not unconstitutional.
B. BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
After consideration of the physical, mental and emotional needs of the child, the efforts that
the parents have made to adjust to make it in the child's best interest to return home within a
reasonable time, the lack of regular visitation and the failure to maintain regular contact and
communication, the court concludes that it is in the best interest of this child that the parent/child
relationship between her and her natural parents be terminated.
This child has become integrated into the foster family to the extent that her familial identity
is with that family. The foster family is able and willing to permanently treat the child as a
member of the family. There exists a love, affection and other emotional ties between the child
and the foster parents which does not exist between the child and the parents. The capacity and
disposition of the foster parents to give the child love, affection and guidance and to continue the
education of the child far surpasses the capacity and disposition of the parents. The length of time
in a stable satisfactory foster home and the desirability of continuing to live there, and the
permanence of the foster family as a unit all make it in the best interest of this child that she
remain in the foster home.
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ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED: That the parent/child
relationship between this child and her parents be terminated. A review hearing shall be held
within 90 days if this child has not been permanently placed by then. The Assistant Attorney
General is directed to draft Findings and Conclusions and an Order within 15 days consistent with
this decision.
Dated this

Q?

day of November, 1997.

BY THE COURT:

Scott N. Johansen, Judge
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Edwin T. Peterson #3849
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #1231
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorney for State of Utah
140 West 425 South (330-15)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Telephone: (801) 722-6546
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
In the interest of:
MACE, Nicole Ann

04/22/96

A person(s) under 18 years of age.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION S OF LAW AND ORDER
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
Case No. 909850
Judge: Scott N. Johanson

This matter came before the Honorable Scott N. Johanson for trial on the State of Utah's
Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights with respect to the parental rights of Dennis
Mace and Amy Opshal Mace to the above-named Child on the 28th and 29th day of October,
1997 at 9:30 a.m. Edwin T. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the
State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"). William McCairns was present
as the representative of DCFS. Cleve Hatch appeared as the Guardian ad Litem for the abovereferenced child (the "Child"). Patricia Geary was present representing Dennis Mace and Amy
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Opsahl Mace, the natural parents of the above-named Child (the "Parents"), who were present.
Clark Allred was present representing Rick and Stacy Myrin (the "Foster Parents").
Based on the exhibits presented into evidence by the parties, the testimony of the witnesses
made in open court, the arguments and presentation of counsel, and the pleadings on file herein
and good cause appearing, the Court hereby finds that it has jurisdiction over the matter and
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-104(l)(c) and Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-104(l)(e) et seq., the
Termination of Parental Rights Act, makes the following findings of fact and order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

DCFS's Petition for Termination of Parental Rights was filed with this Court on or

about May 8, 1997, by Edwin T. Peterson, the Assistant Attorney General.
2.

The contents of the petition are sufficient and in accordance with Utah Code Ann.

§78-3a-405.
3.

Based on the evidence presented and upon the pleadings filed herein, the court finds

that the petitioner has established the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
A.

Nicole Mace was born on April 22, 1996 to Dennis Mace and Amy Opsahl.

Hospital staff made a referral to the Division of Child and Family Services (hereinafter DCFS)
based on a lack of bonding between the mother and the baby, and a need for special care relative
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to a heart monitor. The child was taken into custody on April 24, 1996 and a petition for custody
filed by DCFS was adjudicated on June 5, 1996.
B.

The court returned the child to the parents under Protective Supervision. The child

was hospitalized on June 5 and hospital staff refiised to release her to her parents until the parents
were trained in CPR and in the operation of the heart monitor.
C.

Because the parents did not avail themselves of the necessary training, a new petition

was filed on June 10 seeking custody be placed with DCFS.
D.

The baby was taken into protective custody on June 10 for the second time pursuant

to this second petition. Up to that time she had been in DCFS custody or in the hospital but never
in the parent's custody. Temporary custody was granted by the court on June 12, 1996, after
which DCFS began to implement a reunification plan which consisted of visitation between the
parents and the baby as often as possible, establishment of a home appropriate for a newborn,
having the parents learn parenting skills, CPR skills and heart and breath monitor skills.
E.

While this written treatment plan was very poorly drafted, almost devoid of the

specificity necessary to be understood and carried out by low functioning parents, nevertheless
DCFS made diligent efforts to provide services.
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F.

A peer parent was provided to supervise visits and to teach parents appropriate

parenting techniques. Peer parenting is an expensive and intensive program where an individual
spends time with the parents, often daily, and often at all hours of the night, teaching them basic
minimum parental functions which competent parents may take for granted, such as not feeding
a newborn solid foods, changing diapers periodically, and how to bathe a baby. This peer
parenting began immediately on June 12 with the goal of reuniting the baby with the parents as
soon as possible. Initially the parents exhibited a lack of interest in caring for the baby, though
limited progress was made.
G.

Monitor training was arranged, the home was visited and inspected by DCFS,

psychological evaluations for the parents were scheduled, and the DCFS worker and peer parent
spent considerable time teaching and advising parents on things they needed to do.
H.

Visits of the child to the home gradually increased until overnight visits were

allowed with die worker checking on the family late at night and early in the morning. The peer
parent was in the home on thirteen different days within the first 30 days or so, and was on call
whenever the parents had questions. She needed to be present or available to come to the home
when the baby was there.
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I.

Through June, July and August of 1996, the parents passed the monitor training and

visits were fairly regular. However, as time went on, the aunt, with whom the parents were
living, began to handle the baby during visits, and on some occasions the parents weren't even
present. When they were present the peer parent was frustrated that basic parenting skills had to
be taught over and over again at each visit because the parents weren't retaining what they had
been taught.
J.

The parent's living arrangements were unacceptable to DCFS because they were

living with various relatives or others who were either unacceptable themselves because of prior
substantiated sex abuse referrals or who's homes did not meet basic minimum standards of
cleanliness. The family received attention from DCFS in one form or another on 33 different days
from June 12 to August 30.
K.

In late August the parents appeared to begin to lose interest in the baby. The parents

accepted the responsibility of requesting further visits. Visits became sporadic and then ceased.
The parents continued to have unstable living arrangements. At one point DCFS and the parents'
attorney lost track of the parents altogether because of their moving. They told the peer parent
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they were moving but wouldn't say where, so they were instructed to call when they were ready
for visits to resume. They had no phone or transportation so communications ceased.
L.

As the first treatment plan drew to a close at the end of 1996 the parents had

complied with the requirement of receiving the monitor and had recently (on December 18)
obtained suitable housing. They were in non-compliance with visitation and learning parenting
skills. There were no visits whatsoever between August 27 and December 18, though there would
have been visits arranged anytime the parents had asked or even made their whereabouts known.
Without visits it was not possible for the peer parent to teach parenting skills. There was no other
regular contact or communication with the baby during this period.
M.

Psychological assessments had been completed on both parents, the conclusions of

which were that while the father lacked the cognitive abilities to care for himself without adult
assistance, let alone care for and protect a baby, the mother was capable of learning parenting
skills.
N.

Meanwhile the baby had been with the same foster parents since three days after her

birth, was developing love, affection and emotional ties to those foster parents and was becoming
integrated into the foster family to the extent that her family identification was becoming that of
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the foster family.

The foster home was stable and satisfactory.

The baby was ahead

developmentally and had outgrown the need for the heart and breath monitor. She recognized the
foster parents as fulfilling the roles of parents in her life.
0.

A second reunification treatment plan was implemented with a beginning date of

January 1, 1997, although the signatures bear the date of February 6, 1997. This treatment plan
had more detail than the first one and therefore it was more easily understood and helpful to the
parents. Visitation was still the key factor in reunification with the first four visits specified to
be held at the DCFS office for one hour, all to be completed within four weeks. Thereafter the
visits were allowed in the parents' home and could be longer. Transportation and cancellation
policies were clear, as was designation of who could be present, and who was to supervise the
visits.
P.

In addition, parenting classes were required, as well as appropriate housing, peer

parenting, and a vague requirement to "explore occupational and educational opportunities" and
to "plan financially for their family and work towards self-sufficiency."
Q.

Visits were re-established for December 23 but the parents' attorney failed to notify

the parents and the first visit since August was January 2, 1997. Visits on January 16 and January
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22 were both canceled because the baby was sick. Visits did take place on January 2, January 9
and February 6, with no substantial problems but with some concerns. The parents canceled the
visits for January 30 and February 13.
R.

During the months of January and February 1997 the parents failed to attend any

parenting classes though everything had been arranged by DCFS for the parents to attend; nor did
the parents make any effons toward exploring occupational or educational opportunities or in
doing any financial planning to work toward self-sufficiency. The social worker went over the
treatment plan very carefully with the parents to be sure that they understood and emphasized the
urgency of immediately establishing a relationship with the baby. The parents did have clean and
adequate housing. They failed to avail themselves of WIC (Well Infant Child) services which
were free of cost to the parents, even though the social worker requested them to do so.
S.

Peer parenting was attempted again beginning in February 1997. It was necessary

to begin at the beginning because the parents had retained nothing from the previous sessions.
The parents were not receptive to the peer parent because they felt that she was more interested
in persuading them to use birth control than in teaching parenting skills.

<
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T.

In March a bonding assessment evaluation was conducted on the baby, the parents

and the foster parents by the Family and Attachment Center, the conclusion of which was that
there was no significant bond between the baby and the parents and that the parents lacked the
basic parenting skills necessary to care for her emotional and physical well-being. Conversely
the baby exhibited secure healthy and normal parent/child attachment to the foster parents.
U.

Also in March a second parenting class was offered to the parents. They failed to

attend any of the classes but did attend five of six sessions arranged independent of DCFS by the
parents' attorney with the attorney's sister, who had taught parenting classes in the past. The
parents missed approximately one-half of the scheduled visits with the baby in March and April.
On some of those visits the parents showed up late after the baby and the foster parents had left.
Peer parenting continued through April with no significant change in parenting skills. The baby
was treating the visits as visits with strangers or at best acquaintances, but not as parents, with
some increasing anxiety and some sleep loss after the visits. The parents seemed uncomfortable
and relieved to get the visits over with.
V.

The court terminated the DCFS obligation to attempt to reunify the family on April

24, 1997. Since that time there has been no visitation or other communication between the parents
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and the baby and the parents have made no efforts to change their circumstances. The baby has
become evermore integrated and attached to the only family she has ever known. At no time have
the parents ever contributed to the cost of caring for the baby. They have never been financially
able to do so, and no contribution has been solicited. The foster parents wish to adopt. They
appear able and willing in every way to provide for the needs of this child as they have done since
her birth.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
A.

The court concludes that the parents have exhibited a conscious disregard of their

parental obligations which has lead to the destruction of the parent child relationship. Therefore,
as alleged in the foster parents' petition, the parents have abandoned the child within the definition
of Utah Code Annotated 78-3a-407(l).
B.

The mother has neglected this child within the meaning of 78-3a-407(2) by repeated

or continuous failure to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education or other
care necessary for the physical, mental and emotional health and development of the child, the
mother being capable of providing such care.
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C.

The father is unfit or incompetent within the meaning of 78-3a-407(3) in that his

mental deficiency renders him unable to care for the immediate and continuous physical or
emotional needs of the child for an extended period of time.
D.

This child has been in an out of home placement since birth, and DCFS for a period

of 12 months made diligent efforts to provide appropriate services. The parents neglected,
refused or were unwilling or unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the out of home
placement. The coun notes that the 78-3a-407(4) does not require that the circumstances to be
remedied are those which caused the original removal. Rather the statute requires the remedying
of the circumstances that cause out of home placement. In other words, the causes of the out of
home placement are fluid as dangers to the child change while the child is in out of home
placement. While the primary cause of the original removal was the need to train the parents on
the operation of the heart/breath monitor, it immediately became clear that the parents were not
capable of providing the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or other care necessary for
her physical, mental and emotional health and development. This parental unfitness caused the
continued out of home placement and must be considered in an analysis of 78-3a-407(4) along
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with those causes of the initial removal. Further, there is a substantial likelihood that the parents
will not be capable of exercising proper parental care in the near future.
E.

The parents have been unable or unwilling within a reasonable time to substantially

correct the circumstances that lead to the placement, notwithstanding reasonable and appropriate
efforts by DCFS to return the child to the parents. Specifically the parents have failed to comply
substantially with two different treatment plans. This child was removed from the parents'
custody as a baby and has been out of their custody for over a year and one-half, the child's entire
life, in spite of a diligent effort by DCFS at reunification. Again, the circumstances which lead
to the placement of the child are not limited to the original removal, but rather include other
circumstances which developed during the placement and which prevent return of the child to her
parents. This failure of parental adjustment has been notwithstanding reasonable and appropriate
efforts by DCFS to return the child to the parents.
F.

The parents have made only token efforts and in some cases no effort at all to

support or communicate with the child, to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or
emotional abuse, and to avoid being unfit in accordance with 78-3a-407(6).

(
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G.

The court concludes that while parental rights are constitutionally protected, the

legislature is not prevented from altering the statutory grounds for termination. Protecting
children and providing permanency for them are compelling state interests. The addition of
Section (4), (5), and (6) to 78-3a-407 was within the province of the legislature to do, and these
subsections are not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore are not unconstitutional.
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
A.

After consideration of the physical, mental and emotional needs of the child, the

efforts that the parents have made to adjust to make it in the child's best interest to return home
within a reasonable time, the lack of regular visitation and the failure to maintain regular contact
and communication, the court concludes that it is in the best interest of this child that the
parent/child relationship between her and her natural parents be terminated.
B.

The child has become integrated into the foster family to the extent that her familial

identity is with that family. The foster family is able and willing to permanently treat the child
as a member of the family. There exists a love, affection and other emotional ties between the
child and the foster parents which does not exists between the child and the parents. The capacity
and disposition of the foster parents to give the child love, affection and guidance and to continue
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the education of the child far surpasses the capacity and disposition of the parents. The length of
time in a stable satisfactory foster home and the desirability of continuing to live there, and the
permanency of the foster family as a unit all make it in the best interest of this child that she
remain in the foster home.
Upon consideration of the provisions set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-401 et seq, the
court finds that it is in the best interests of the Child that the parental rights of Dennis Mace and
Amy Opsahl Mace should be terminated.
ORDER TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
1.

The statutory requirements having been met, the Court hereby terminates any and

all parental rights of Dennis Mace and Amy Opsahl Mace to Nicole Ann Mace, born 04/22/96.
2.

That temporary care, custody, control and guardianship of Nicole Ann Mace is

continued with DCFS for one (1) year unless modified by this court in the dispositional phase of
this matter.
3.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-413(l), this order shall divest the child and the

parents of all legal rights, powers, immunities, duties, and obligations with respect to each other,
except the right of the child to inherit from the parents.
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5.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-413(2), this order does not disentitle the Child

to any benefit due her from any third person, including, but not limited to, any Indian tribe,
agency, state, or the United States.
6.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-413(3), the parents shall forthwith neither be

entitled to any notice of proceedings for the adoption of the child nor shall have any right to object
to the adoption or to participate in any other placement proceedings.
7.

In accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-412, a review of this matter, including

the dispositional phase of this matter, shall be held within 90 days.
DATED this J[*~ day of ^ygmJlm

, 1997.

BY THE COURT
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